Ensuring user privacy remains critical in mobile networks, particularly with the rise of connected devices and denser 5G infrastructure. Privacy concerns have persisted across 2G, 3G, and 4G/LTE networks. Recognizing these concerns, the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) has made privacy enhancements in 5G Release 15. However, the extent of operator adoption remains unclear, especially as most networks operate in 5G Non Stand Alone (NSA) mode, relying on 4G Core Networks. This study provides the first qualitative and experimental comparison between 5G NSA and Stand Alone (SA) in real operator networks, focusing on privacy enhancements addressing top eight pre-5G attacks based on recent academic literature. Additionally, it evaluates the privacy levels of OpenAirInterface (OAI), a leading open-source software for 5G, against real network deployments for the same attacks. The analysis reveals two new 5G privacy vulnerabilities, underscoring the need for further research and stricter standards.

翻译：在移动网络中，确保用户隐私至关重要，尤其是在联网设备激增和5G基础设施日益密集的背景下。隐私问题在2G、3G和4G/LTE网络中持续存在。认识到这些担忧，第三代合作伙伴计划（3GPP）在5G Release 15中增强了隐私保护功能。然而，运营商的采用程度尚不明确，特别是由于大多数网络以5G非独立组网（NSA）模式运行，依赖于4G核心网。本研究首次在实际运营商网络中，对5G NSA与独立组网（SA）进行了定性和实验性比较，重点关注基于近期学术文献中针对前八大5G前攻击的隐私增强措施。此外，本研究还评估了领先的5G开源软件OpenAirInterface（OAI）在相同攻击场景下，相较于实际网络部署的隐私保护水平。分析揭示了两种新的5G隐私漏洞，强调了进一步研究和更严格标准的必要性。