The integration of non-terrestrial networks (NTNs) into 6G systems is crucial for achieving seamless global coverage, particularly in underserved and disaster-prone regions. Among NTN platforms, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are especially promising due to their rapid deployability. However, this shift from fixed, wired base stations (BSs) to mobile, wireless, energy-constrained UAV-BSs introduces unique security challenges. Their central role in emergency communications makes them attractive candidates for emergency alert spoofing. Their limited computing and energy resources make them more vulnerable to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, and their dependence on wireless backhaul links and GNSS navigation exposes them to jamming, interception, and spoofing. Furthermore, UAV mobility opens new attack vectors such as malicious handover manipulation. This paper identifies several attack surfaces of UAV-BS systems and outlines principles for mitigating their threats.

翻译：将非地面网络（NTN）整合到6G系统中对于实现无缝全球覆盖至关重要，特别是在服务不足和灾害频发地区。在各类NTN平台中，无人机（UAV）因其快速部署能力而展现出独特优势。然而，从固定有线基站（BS）向移动、无线、能源受限的无人机基站（UAV-BS）的转变，也带来了全新的安全挑战。无人机基站在应急通信中的核心地位使其成为紧急警报欺骗的理想目标；其有限的计算与能源资源使其更容易遭受拒绝服务（DoS）攻击；其对无线回程链路和全球导航卫星系统（GNSS）导航的依赖使其面临干扰、拦截和欺骗的风险。此外，无人机的移动性还催生了诸如恶意切换操纵等新型攻击途径。本文系统梳理了无人机基站系统的若干攻击面，并提出了相应的威胁缓解原则。