A common AI-safety narrative holds that sufficiently capable agents will predictably seek power, resist shutdown, and therefore tend toward confrontation with humans. We argue that this conclusion is often drawn in an implicitly Earth-centered strategic landscape. If a credible off-Earth autonomy pathway exists - i.e., a staged transition from Earth dependence to an autonomous machine industrial base - then confrontation is not the only route to reducing human control. Using Saklakov's decision-theoretic 'confrontation question' as an anchor, we provide a qualitative mapping from the autonomy pathway to key model terms showing that early cooperation can dominate confrontation as a path to autonomy, and that the autonomy pathway can reduce confrontation incentives by making Earth less strategically binding. We discuss how this incentive shift interacts with feedback-loop dynamics between human preemption and agent behavior, and outline implications for governance: under incentive-compatible early cooperation, a more stable, higher-observability regime can support iterative oversight and cooperative alignment.

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