Large language model agents are entering regulated financial systems, yet research on their attack surface remains predominantly laboratory-based, and practitioner guidance is neither peer-reviewed nor connected to a formal threat model. Using production evidence, we map six agentic threat categories, namely prompt injection, identity and authorization, action auditability, tool abuse, data residency, and boundary policy enforcement, to the specific control obligations imposed by US and EU financial regulation (ECOA and Regulation B, EU AI Act, GDPR Article 22, and FINRA's 2026 agent guidance), showing how legal accountability increases their operational significance. We distill these obligations into five runtime control invariants with reference algorithms that enforce them at auditable architectural boundaries. We develop a formal model expressing each invariant as a predicate over a case-bound event chain and prove the audit reconstruction gate is sound and complete with respect to these invariants: compliance is decidable from the case identifier alone. We show that two of the invariants constrain audit cost and throughput rather than constituting pure operational overhead. We document four architectural patterns from a production Know Your Customer (KYC) deployment for a consumer credit product that reduced multi-day manual processing to same-day automated resolution for approximately four in five cases. Finally, we report three negative results, two identified through internal audit or production observation rather than adversarial testing. We conclude that securing agents in regulated environments depends less on novel attack classes than on rendering auditability, least-privilege authorization, and boundary policy enforcement, with verifiable compliance and bounded audit cost at scale.
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