A Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) is a key component for the transparency of software supply chain; it is a structured inventory of the components, dependencies, and associated metadata of a software artifact. However, an SBOM often contain sensitive information that organizations are unwilling to disclose in full to anyone, for two main concerns: technological risks deriving from exposing proprietary dependencies or unpatched vulnerabilities, and business risks, deriving from exposing architectural strategies. Therefore, delivering a plaintext SBOM may result in the disruption of the intellectual property of a company. To address this, we present VeriSBOM, a trustless, selectively disclosed SBOM framework that provides cryptographic verifiability of SBOMs using zero-knowledge proofs. Within VeriSBOM, third parties can validate specific statements about a delivered software. Respectively, VeriSBOM allows independent third parties to verify if a software contains authentic dependencies distributed by official package managers and that the same dependencies satisfy rigorous policy constraints such as the absence of vulnerable dependencies or the adherence with specific licenses models. VeriSBOM leverages a scalable vector commitment scheme together with folding-based proof aggregation to produce succinct zero-knowledge proofs that attest to security and compliance properties while preserving confidentiality. Crucially, the verification process requires no trust in the SBOM publisher beyond the soundness of the underlying primitives, and third parties can independently check proofs against the public cryptographic commitments. We implement VeriSBOM, analyze its security, and evaluate its performance on real-world package registries. The results show that our method enables scalable, privacy-preserving, and verifiable SBOM sharing and validation.

翻译：软件物料清单（SBOM）是保障软件供应链透明度的关键组件，它是以结构化形式记录软件制品组件、依赖项及相关元数据的清单。然而，SBOM常包含组织不愿完全公开的敏感信息，主要基于两方面考量：一是暴露专有依赖项或未修补漏洞可能引发的技术风险，二是暴露架构策略可能带来的商业风险。因此，直接交付明文SBOM可能导致企业知识产权泄露。为解决此问题，我们提出VeriSBOM——一个基于零知识证明、具备选择性披露功能的无信任SBOM框架，可提供SBOM的密码学可验证性。在VeriSBOM框架中，第三方能够验证关于交付软件的特定声明。具体而言，VeriSBOM允许独立第三方验证软件是否包含来自官方包管理器的真实依赖项，并确认这些依赖项满足严格的策略约束（例如不存在易受攻击的依赖项或符合特定许可证模型）。VeriSBOM采用可扩展的向量承诺方案与基于折叠的证明聚合技术，生成可证明安全性与合规性且保持机密性的简洁零知识证明。关键优势在于，验证过程除依赖基础密码原语的安全性外，无需信任SBOM发布方，第三方可独立根据公开的密码学承诺验证证明。我们实现了VeriSBOM系统，分析了其安全性，并在真实软件包注册表上评估了性能。结果表明，该方法能够实现可扩展、隐私保护且可验证的SBOM共享与验证。