We model the ultimate price paid by users of a decentralized ledger as resulting from a two-stage game where Miners (/Proposers/etc.) first purchase blockspace via a Tullock contest, and then price that space to users. When analyzing our distributed ledger model, we find: - A characterization of all possible pure equilibria (although pure equilibria are not guaranteed to exist). - A natural sufficient condition, implied by Regularity (a la [Mye81]), for existence of a ''market-clearing'' pure equilibrium where Miners choose to sell all space allocated by the Distributed Ledger Protocol, and that this equilibrium is unique. - The market share of the largest miner is the relevant ''measure of decentralization'' to determine whether a market-clearing pure equilibrium exists. - Block rewards do not impact users' prices at equilibrium, when pure equilibria exist. But, higher block rewards can cause pure equilibria to exist. We also discuss aspects of our model and how they relate to blockchains deployed in practice. For example, only ''patient'' users (who are happy for their transactions to enter the blockchain under any miner) would enjoy the conclusions highlighted by our model, whereas ''impatient'' users (who are interested only for their transaction to be included in the very next block) still face monopoly pricing.

翻译：我们通过一个两阶段博弈模型来刻画去中心化账本用户最终支付的价格：矿工（或提案者等）首先通过塔洛克竞赛购买区块空间，随后将该空间定价出售给用户。在分析我们的分布式账本模型时，我们发现：- 所有可能纯策略均衡的特征描述（尽管纯策略均衡的存在性无法保证）。- 由正则性条件（遵循[Mye81]的定义）导出的一个自然充分条件，可保证存在一个"市场出清"的纯策略均衡，此时矿工选择出售分布式账本协议分配的全部空间，且该均衡具有唯一性。- 最大矿工的市场份额是决定市场出清纯策略均衡是否存在的关键"去中心化度量指标"。- 当纯策略均衡存在时，区块奖励不影响用户的均衡价格；但更高的区块奖励可能促使纯策略均衡形成。我们还讨论了模型特性与实际部署区块链的关联性。例如，仅"有耐心"的用户（愿意接受任何矿工将其交易纳入区块链）能享受模型所强调的结论，而"无耐心"的用户（只关注交易能否进入下一个区块）仍将面临垄断定价。