We study a screening problem in which an agent privately observes a set of feasible technologies and can strategically disclose only a subset to the principal. The principal then takes an action whose payoff consequences for both players are publicly known. Under the assumption that the possible technology sets are ordered by set inclusion, we show that the optimal mechanism promises the agent a utility that is weakly increasing as the reported set expands, and the choice of the principal maximizes her own utility subject to this promised utility constraint. Moreover, the optimal promised utility either coincides with the agent's utility under the complete information benchmark or remains locally constant, with the number of constant segments bounded by the number of downward-sloping segments of the complete information benchmark.

翻译：本文研究一个筛选问题，其中代理人私下观察一组可行技术，并策略性地仅向委托人披露其子集。随后委托人采取一项行动，该行动对双方参与者的收益影响是公开信息。在假定可能的技术集按集合包含关系排序的条件下，我们证明最优机制承诺给代理人的效用随其报告集合的扩大而弱递增，且委托人的选择在满足该承诺效用约束的条件下最大化自身效用。此外，最优承诺效用要么与完全信息基准下代理人的效用重合，要么在局部保持恒定，其恒定区段的数量受限于完全信息基准效用曲线的递减段数量。