We study dynamic games with hidden states and absorbing failure, where belief-driven actions can trigger irreversible collapse. In such environments, equilibria that sustain activity generically operate at the boundary of viability. We show that this geometry endogenously reverses the value of information: greater informational precision increases the probability of collapse on every finite horizon. We formalize this mechanism through a limit-viability criterion, and model opacity as a strategic choice of the information structure via Blackwell garbling. When failure is absorbing, survival values become locally concave in beliefs, implying that transparency destroys equilibrium viability while sufficient opacity restores it. In an extended game where agents choose the information structure ex ante, strictly positive opacity is necessary for equilibrium survival. The results identify irreversible failure--not coordination, misspecification, or ambiguity--as a primitive force generating an endogenous demand for opacity in dynamic games.

翻译：我们研究具有隐藏状态和吸收性失败的动态博弈，其中信念驱动的行动可能引发不可逆崩溃。在此类环境中，维持活动的均衡通常运行于生存边界。我们证明，这种几何结构内生地逆转了信息的价值：更高的信息精度会增加每个有限时间范围内的崩溃概率。我们通过极限生存性准则形式化这一机制，并将信息不透明性建模为通过布莱克韦尔信息混淆对信息结构的策略性选择。当失败具有吸收性时，生存价值在信念中呈现局部凹性，这意味着透明度会破坏均衡生存性，而足够的不透明性可恢复之。在代理人先验选择信息结构的扩展博弈中，严格正的不透明性是均衡生存的必要条件。研究结果表明，不可逆失败——而非协调失灵、模型误设或模糊性——是动态博弈中产生内生不透明性需求的根本驱动力。