Akbarpour and Li (2020) formalized credibility as an auction desideratum where the auctioneer cannot benefit by implementing undetectable deviations from the promised auction and showed that, in the plain model, the ascending price auction with reserves is the only credible, strategyproof, revenue-optimal auction. Ferreira and Weinberg (2020) proposed the Deferred Revelation Auction (DRA) as a communication efficient auction that avoids the uniqueness results from Akbarpour and Li (2020) assuming the existence of cryptographic commitments and as long as bidder valuations are MHR. They also showed DRA is not credible in settings where bidder valuations are $\alpha$-strongly regular unless $\alpha > 1$. In this paper, we ask if blockchains allow us to design a larger class of credible auctions. We answer this question positively, by showing that DRA is credible even for $\alpha$-strongly regular distributions for all $\alpha > 0$ if implemented over a secure and censorship-resistant blockchain. We argue ledgers provide two properties that limit deviations from a self-interested auctioneer. First, the existence of smart contracts allows one to extend the concept of credibility to settings where the auctioneer does not have a reputation -- one of the main limitations for the definition of credibility from Akbarpour and Li (2020). Second, blockchains allow us to implement mechanisms over a public broadcast channel, removing the adaptive undetectable deviations driving the negative results of Ferreira and Weinberg (2020).

翻译：Akbarpour与Li（2020）将可信性形式化为拍卖的理想属性，即拍卖人无法通过实施不可检测的偏离承诺拍卖的行为获益，并证明在基础模型中，带保留价的升价拍卖是唯一可信、策略证明且收益最优的拍卖。Ferreira与Weinberg（2020）提出延迟揭示拍卖（DRA）作为通信高效的拍卖方案，在假设存在密码学承诺且竞拍者估值满足MHR性质的条件下，规避了Akbarpour与Li（2020）的唯一性结论。他们同时证明，当竞拍者估值服从α-强正则分布时，除非α>1，否则DRA不可信。本文探讨区块链能否使我们设计更广泛的可信拍卖类别。我们对此问题给出肯定回答：若通过安全且抗审查的区块链实施DRA，则对于所有α>0的α-强正则分布，DRA均保持可信性。我们认为账本提供了两项限制自利拍卖人偏离行为的关键特性：首先，智能合约的存在使得可信性概念可扩展至拍卖人无声誉的场景——这正是Akbarpour与Li（2020）可信性定义的主要局限；其次，区块链允许通过公共广播信道实施机制，消除了导致Ferreira与Weinberg（2020）负面结论的自适应不可检测偏离行为。