Ethereum's ideal of censorship resistance, together with related fairness properties, is undermined in practice, motivating fairness mechanisms that aim to restore these properties. Several of these mechanisms hand control over block contents to a committee of proposers under a 1-of-n honest assumption: at least one committee member complies with the mechanism even when deviating would increase personal revenue. We refer to such proposers as altruistic. Yet prior work shows that roughly 91 percent of blocks are constructed by centralized block-building services that demonstrably take user-adverse actions for financial gain; the responsible proposers sign these blocks blindly, without any means of intervention. A common reading of this figure is that 9 percent of proposers forgo these gains and act altruistically. Our empirical analysis of the full year 2025 shows that this share is far smaller: at most 1.55 percent of proposers can plausibly be regarded as altruistic, whereas the remaining 98.45 percent of proposers exhibit observable non-altruistic behavior. We interpret 1.55 percent as an upper bound on the prevalence of altruistic proposers. These results imply that committee-based fairness mechanisms that rely on altruistic members would require substantially larger committees than currently proposed. This raises concerns about their practical viability and motivates mechanisms in which fair behavior is the rational choice.

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