A game may have, for each target below its value, a finite controller meeting that target, yet no finite controller attaining the value itself. We study finite stochastic games with a hard specification that must hold on every supported execution, including paths of probability zero. Max uses a pure finite controller; Min may use any pure public-history strategy. We distinguish three numerical questions: can a supplied target be met, can the unspecified optimum be attained, and what is one exact value? For explicit hard and Boolean soft Streett conditions, the strict and non-strict supplied-threshold problems are coNP-complete, attainment of the unsupplied supremum is $\mathrm P^{\mathrm{NP}}$-complete, and one exact reduced fraction is $\mathrm{FP}^{\mathrm{NP}}$-complete under polynomial metric reductions. The proofs preserve both the value and its finite attainability when fixing a single opponent, and encode adaptive queries without computing unknown subgame values. The same construction yields matching value-comparison and exact-output lower bounds for ordinary stochastic Streett games with unrestricted randomized history strategies. We also bound the memory needed for optimal finite implementations for arbitrary Muller hard conditions and rational rewards in $[0,1]$ determined by infinitely recurring states. One controller is sure from the entire original sure region and attains at every finitely attained start, with no attainment premise on the other states. For $n$ states in that region it uses $2^{O(n\log(n+1))}Q(1+\log R)$ modes, where $Q$ is the product of the least common denominators of full original chance rows sourced in that sure region and $R$ clears all reward values. Its joint dependence on $Q$ and $R$ is worst-case sharp at each fixed $n\ge6$ when $Q,R\ge2$. Optimal dependence on arena size and efficient general synthesis are not resolved here.

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