Correlated equilibria are a fundamental solution concept in game theory, introduced in seminal work by Robert Aumann in the 1970s. A textbook fact is that correlated equilibria enjoy more desirable computational properties vis-a-vis Nash equilibria: they can be computed in polynomial time in normal-form games via linear programming, and are also amenable to learning via decentralized no-swap-regret dynamics. However, the complexity beyond games of polynomial type---such as extensive-form games, and more broadly concave games---has remained a major open problem, first highlighted by Papadimitriou and Roughgarden (JACM '08). We show that computing an approximate correlated equilibrium of a polytope game is PPAD-complete, and thus polynomial-time equivalent to finding a Nash equilibrium. This challenges the conventional view in game theory that correlated equilibria are more tractable objects than Nash equilibria. Moreover, we establish an unconditional, information-theoretic lower bound ruling out the existence of a strongly sublinear swap regret minimizer: any online learning algorithm requires exponentially many iterations in the dimension $d$ to guarantee at most $1/\text{poly}(d)$ swap regret. To circumvent these hardness results, we examine the complexity of $Φ$-equilibria---tractable relaxations of correlated equilibria. We obtain a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for computing poly-dimensional $Φ$-equilibria in general concave games. We complement this by showing that Contraction-hardness persists even under poly-dimensional swap deviations in the regime where the precision $ε$ is exponentially small. Finally, we show that Contraction-hardness can be bypassed in the canonical setting of concave \emph{quadratic games}, for which we provide a $\text{poly}(d, \log(1/ε))$-time algorithm for computing poly-dimensional $Φ$-equilibria.
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