Modern platforms such as Ethereum and Polkadot nowadays execute Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus protocols over large validator committees, often comprising hundreds of nodes. At this scale, complete graph topologies for connecting nodes are impractical, leading systems to adopt various gossip mechanisms, often in an ad hoc manner. In this paper, we study the robustness of widely deployed gossip protocols used in committee-based blockchains against realistic network adversaries. We show, both analytically and through extensive empirical measurements, that the graph parameters commonly chosen to instantiate random graphs are insufficient to guarantee that enough honest nodes receive consensus messages for quorum formation in existing protocols. Motivated by this finding, we empirically assess the robustness of Bitcoin's Erdős-Rényi (ER) graphs, Polkadot's grid topology, Ethereum's GossipSub, and Solana's chunk- and tree-based disseminations. Our results reveal surprising tradeoffs: Solana's dynamic trees are bandwidth-efficient in benign settings but fragile under adaptive attacks; Polkadot's grid achieves strong robustness at the cost of high bandwidth overhead; GossipSub is both bandwidth-efficient and resilient to adaptive adversaries, yet highly sensitive to parameter choices; and ER graphs provide a strong robustness-efficiency tradeoff, e.g., when the (average) fanout degree exceeds 15 for networks up to 5000 nodes.

翻译：暂无翻译