Power side-channel (PSC) attacks are widely used in embedded microcontrollers, particularly in cryptographic applications, to extract sensitive information. However, expanding the applications of PSC attacks to broader security contexts in the embedded systems domain faces significant challenges. These include the need for specialized hardware setups to manage high noise levels in real-world targets and assumptions regarding the attacker's knowledge and capabilities. This paper systematically analyzes these challenges and introduces a novel signal-processing method that addresses key limitations, enabling effective PSC attacks in real-world embedded systems without requiring hardware modifications. We validate the proposed approach through experiments on real-world black-box embedded devices, verifying its potential to expand its usage in various embedded systems security applications beyond traditional cryptographic applications.

翻译：功耗侧信道（PSC）攻击被广泛应用于嵌入式微控制器，尤其是在密码学应用中，以提取敏感信息。然而，将PSC攻击的应用扩展到嵌入式系统领域更广泛的安全场景中面临着重大挑战。这些挑战包括需要专门的硬件设置来管理实际目标中的高噪声水平，以及对攻击者知识和能力的假设。本文系统分析了这些挑战，并提出了一种新颖的信号处理方法，以解决关键限制，从而能够在无需硬件修改的情况下，在实际嵌入式系统中实现有效的PSC攻击。我们通过对实际黑盒嵌入式设备的实验验证了所提方法，证实了其在超越传统密码学应用的各种嵌入式系统安全应用中扩展使用潜力。