Video world models are increasingly used in autonomous driving to forecast future scene evolution and provide future-aware spatio-temporal representations for downstream action prediction. In perception-to-action pipelines, these representations can directly influence ego-vehicle waypoint planning, making the learned future dynamics a critical security-sensitive component. Despite their promise, the training-time security risks of autonomous-driving video world models remain largely unexplored. We present BadDreamer, a transferable spatio-temporal backdoor attack that targets the perception side of this pipeline. Unlike conventional backdoors that manipulate image labels, prompt outputs, or action supervision, BadDreamer poisons the learned transition dynamics of a video world model. It constructs trigger-erasure sequences in which an oncoming yellow delivery rider is visible in the observed context frames but erased from the future frames. After fine-tuning on a small fraction of such sequences, the compromised world model learns a hidden conditional association: when the physical trigger appears, it hallucinates a future where the rider disappears and the road appears clear. We further show that this corrupted future-aware representation can transfer to the downstream action module without directly modifying ego-trajectory labels, inducing unsafe non-evasive waypoint predictions. Our experiments instantiate this attack on a representative open-source perception-to-action pipeline, revealing a representation-level safety risk in autonomous-driving video world models and highlighting the need for backdoor-aware validation beyond clean generation quality.

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