With the widespread adoption of blockchain technology, the transaction fee mechanism (TFM) in blockchain systems has become a prominent research topic. An ideal TFM should satisfy user incentive compatibility (UIC), miner incentive compatibility (MIC), and miner-user side contract proofness ($c$-SCP). However, state-of-the-art works either fail to meet these three properties simultaneously or only satisfy them under certain conditions. In this paper, we propose a burning $N$-price auction TFM named BNP. This mechanism divides the transaction fee into a base fee, which is burned, and a priority fee, which is allocated to miners. Theoretical proofs and experimental analyses demonstrate that, even under conditions of significant transaction congestion, this mechanism satisfies UIC, MIC, and $c$-SCP simultaneously. Furthermore, the BNP mechanism is not constrained by the type of blockchain consensus, making it widely applicable.

翻译：随着区块链技术的广泛应用，区块链系统中的交易费机制已成为一个重要的研究课题。理想的交易费机制应满足用户激励兼容性、矿工激励兼容性以及矿工-用户侧合约抗性。然而，现有前沿研究要么无法同时满足这三项性质，要么仅在特定条件下满足。本文提出了一种名为 BNP 的燃烧第 N 价拍卖交易费机制。该机制将交易费划分为被燃烧的基础费用和分配给矿工的优先费用。理论证明与实验分析表明，即使在交易严重拥堵的条件下，该机制也能同时满足 UIC、MIC 与 c-SCP。此外，BNP 机制不受区块链共识类型的限制，具有广泛的适用性。