In metric social choice, each voter ranks a set of $m$ candidates by her distance to them in an unknown metric space. The cost of a candidate is its average distance to the voters. A randomized voting rule must use only the rankings to choose a lottery over candidates. Its distortion is the worst-case ratio between the expected cost under the lottery it returns and the cost of the best candidate. Charikar, Ramakrishnan, Wang, and Wu [JACM 2024] prove an upper bound of $2.753$, establishing a constant separation from deterministic rules, for which the best achievable distortion is $3$. Independently, Frank [arXiv:2608.17863] and Ye [arXiv:2608.21202] improve the bound to $2.5$, using an equal mixture of maximal lottery and Integrated Veto. The existing arguments do not yield a better bound with any mixture of these rules. We break this barrier with a new ingredient, a random-size stable lottery. Let $D$ be a random variable over the domain of positive integers. A random-size stable lottery $\mathrm{RSL}_D$ guarantees that the probability of a random voter preferring any fixed candidate $c$ to her favorite of $D$ i.i.d. draws from $\mathrm{RSL}_D$ is at most $\mathbb{E}[1/(D+1)]$, where the probability also averages over $D$. When $D=k$ deterministically, this reduces to the stable $k$-lottery of Charikar, Ramakrishnan, Tan, and Wang [EC 2025]; the case $k=1$ is precisely a maximal lottery. Their minimax argument for a fixed $k$ easily generalizes to a random $D$. Our main contribution is to show how stability with respect to a random $D$ can be used to bound distortion. By mixing a suitably chosen random-size stable lottery with Integrated Veto, we get distortion at most $11641/5000=2.3282$. The proof combines infinite-dimensional conic linear-programming duality, heuristic nonlinear optimization, and exact rational verification via the Bernstein basis.

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