Evolution of agents' dynamics of multiagent systems under consensus protocol in the face of jamming attacks is discussed, where centralized parties are able to influence the control signals of the agents. In this paper we focus on a game-theoretical approach of multiagent systems where the players have incomplete information on their opponents' strength. We consider repeated games with both simultaneous and sequential player actions where players update their beliefs of each other over time. The effect of the players' optimal strategies according to Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium on agents' consensus is examined. It is shown that an attacker with incomplete knowledge may fail to prevent consensus despite having sufficient resources to do so.

翻译：本文探讨了在干扰攻击下，采用一致性协议的多智能体系统中智能体动力学的演化问题，其中中心化参与者能够影响智能体的控制信号。本文聚焦于多智能体系统的博弈论方法，博弈方对其对手实力掌握不完全信息。我们考虑了同时行动与序贯行动两种重复博弈场景，博弈方随时间不断更新对彼此的信念。研究了基于贝叶斯纳什均衡与完美贝叶斯均衡的博弈方最优策略对智能体一致性的影响。结果表明，即使拥有充足资源，掌握不完全信息的攻击者也可能无法阻止一致性达成。