Multi-agent debate (MAD) was proposed as a promising approach for ensembling the wisdom of multiple large language models (LLMs) to improve reasoning and provide effective supervision to superhuman LLMs. However, increasing empirical evidence suggests that MAD may not outperform or even significantly underperform single-agent approaches (SA), raising doubts about the benefits of MAD. In this work, we investigate this issue by analyzing the incentive structures of popular MAD paradigms: (i) competitive MAD (CopMAD) where agents compete by holding opposing positions; (ii) consensus-seeking MAD (CosMAD) where agents are driven to seek consensus. We show that both paradigms suffer from debate hacking: CopMAD reduces to a cheap-talk game, where agents produce misleading messages to win the game, while CosMAD filters out informative disagreements for premature consensus. Consequently, agents in both CopMAD and CosMAD fail to jointly resolve the ambiguity and seek the truth. To this end, we introduce ColMAD, a collaborative protocol that reframes MAD as a non-zero-sum game to encourage agents to provide informative while truthful messages. Through extensive benchmarking on challenging tasks such as error detection, we show that ColMAD significantly outperforms previous MAD protocols up to 10 percentage points. Under the same budgets, ColMAD effectively brings non-trivial improvements over SA methods, implying that the protocol design is critical to realizing the potential of MAD.

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