Industrial anomaly detection is evaluated largely on simulators, and recent work reports large drops, with unstable rankings, on real plant data. We ask whether that extends to the security case. We evaluate eleven detectors across classical, neural, dependency and causal families on a simulated chemical process and a sodium thermal-hydraulic facility: different processes sharing no equipment, but both continuous, at steady state, and perturbed only through temperature, pressure, flow and valve, never composition. Three conditions prior work does not cover: disturbances authored against a threat model rather than native faults; one construction applied to both processes; and detection read at a declared false-alarm budget. The drop persists throughout. The simulator panel looks deployable, neural matching classical; on plant telemetry detection collapses and the neural family trails, a gap that in-sample thresholds likely understate. Which detector wins transfers between the two processes; how often it fires does not. Two results hold on both. Sequential valve manipulation defeats the whole panel: at tier 2 no detector flags more than 0.17 of its perturbed samples, against 0.89 or better for most disturbances. And the plant's collapse is not merely that its disturbances are weaker, though they are by about twelvefold; matched on measured strength, the plant is never the better detected.

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