Mining attacks enable an adversary to procure a disproportionately large portion of mining rewards by deviating from honest mining practices within the PoW-based blockchain system. In this paper, we demonstrate that the security vulnerabilities of PoW-based blockchain extend beyond what these mining attacks initially reveal. We introduce a novel mining strategy, named BM-PAW, which yields superior rewards for both the attacker and the targeted pool compared to the state-of-the-art mining attack: PAW. Our analysis reveals that BM-PAW attackers are incentivized to offer appropriate bribe money to other targets, as they comply with the attacker's directives upon receiving payment. We find the BM-PAW attacker can circumvent the "miner's dilemma" through equilibrium analysis in a two-pool BM-PAW game scenario, wherein the outcome is determined by the attacker's mining power. We finally propose practical countermeasures to mitigate these novel pool attacks.

翻译：挖矿攻击使得攻击者能够在基于工作量证明（PoW）的区块链系统中通过偏离诚实挖矿实践，获取不成比例的大量挖矿奖励。本文证明，基于PoW的区块链安全漏洞超出了现有挖矿攻击所揭示的范围。我们提出了一种名为BM-PAW的新型挖矿策略，与当前最先进的挖矿攻击PAW相比，该策略能为攻击者及其目标矿池带来更高的收益。分析表明，BM-PAW攻击者有动机向其他目标提供适当的贿赂资金，因为后者在收到付款后会遵从攻击者的指令。通过双矿池BM-PAW博弈场景的均衡分析，我们发现BM-PAW攻击者能够规避“矿工困境”，其博弈结果由攻击者的算力决定。最后，我们提出了实际可行的防御措施以缓解这类新型矿池攻击。