In many real world situations, like minor traffic offenses in big cities, a central authority is tasked with periodic administering punishments to a large number of individuals. Common practice is to give each individual a chance to suffer a smaller fine and be guaranteed to avoid the legal process with probable considerably larger punishment. However, thanks to the large number of offenders and a limited capacity of the central authority, the individual risk is typically small and a rational individual will not choose to pay the fine. Here we show that if the central authority processes the offenders in a publicly known order, it properly incentives the offenders to pay the fine. We show analytically and on realistic experiments that our mechanism promotes non-cooperation and incentives individuals to pay. Moreover, the same holds for an arbitrary coalition. We quantify the expected total payment the central authority receives, and show it increases considerably.

翻译：在许多现实情境中，例如大城市的轻微交通违规行为，中央机构需要定期对大量个体执行惩罚。常见做法是给予每个个体机会，支付较小罚款以避开可能更为严厉的法律程序。然而，由于违规者数量庞大且中央机构处理能力有限，个体面临的风险通常很小，理性的个体不会选择支付罚款。本文证明，若中央机构按公开已知的顺序处理违规者，则能有效激励其支付罚款。我们通过理论分析和实际实验表明，该机制促进非合作行为并激励个体支付罚款。此外，这一结论对任意联盟同样成立。我们量化了中央机构获得的预期总支付，并显示其显著增加。