Two long-lived senders play a dynamic game of competitive persuasion. Each period, each provides information to a single short-lived receiver. When the senders also set prices, we unearth a folk theorem: if they are sufficiently patient, virtually any vector of feasible and individually rational payoffs can be sustained in a subgame perfect equilibrium. Without price-setting, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. In it, patient senders provide less information--maximally patient ones none.

翻译：两位长期存在的发送者展开一场竞争性说服的动态博弈。在每个时期，每位发送者向单一的短期接收者提供信息。当发送者同时设定价格时，我们揭示了一个民间定理：如果发送者足够耐心，几乎所有可行且个体理性的收益向量都能在子博弈完美均衡中维持。若不涉及定价，则存在唯一的子博弈完美均衡。在此均衡中，耐心的发送者提供较少的信息——而最耐心的发送者则不提供任何信息。