Cryptocurrencies employ auction-esque transaction fee mechanisms (TFMs) to allocate transactions to blocks, and to determine how much fees miners can collect from transactions. Several impossibility results show that TFMs that satisfy a standard set of "good" properties obtain low revenue, and in certain cases, no revenue at all. In this work, we circumvent previous impossibilities by showing that when desired TFM properties are reasonably relaxed, simple mechanisms can obtain strictly positive revenue. By discretizing fees, we design a TFM that satisfies the extended TFM desiderata: it is dominant strategy incentive-compatible (DSIC), myopic miner incentive-compatible (MMIC), side-contract-proof (SCP) and obtains asymptotically optimal revenue (i.e., linear in the number of allocated bids), and optimal revenue when considering separable TFMs. If instead of discretizing fees we relax the DSIC and SCP properties, we show that Bitcoin's TFM, after applying the revelation principle, is Bayesian incentive-compatible (BIC), MMIC, off-chain-agreement (OCA) proof, and approximately revenue-optimal. We reach our results by characterizing the class of multi-item OCA-proof mechanisms, which may be of independent interest.

翻译：加密货币采用类拍卖的交易费机制（TFM）将交易分配至区块，并决定矿工可从交易中收取的费用。若干不可能性结果表明，满足标准“良好”属性集的TFM仅能获得低收益，在某些情况下甚至完全无收益。本研究通过合理放宽理想TFM属性，证明简单机制可获得严格正收益，从而规避了先前的不可能性结果。通过对费用进行离散化设计，我们构建了一种满足扩展TFM需求的机制：该机制具有占优策略激励相容性（DSIC）、短视矿工激励相容性（MMIC）、侧合约防护性（SCP），并能获得渐进最优收益（即与分配出价数量呈线性关系），在可分离TFM框架下达到最优收益。若改为放宽DSIC与SCP属性，我们证明比特币的TFM在应用显示原理后具有贝叶斯激励相容性（BIC）、MMIC、链下协议（OCA）防护性及近似收益最优性。我们通过刻画多物品OCA防护机制类别达成这些结论，该理论框架可能具有独立研究价值。