We model incentive security in non-custodial stablecoins and derive conditions for participation in a stablecoin system across risk absorbers (vaults/CDPs) and holders of governance tokens. We apply option pricing theory to derive closed form solutions to the stakeholders' problems, and to value their positions within the capital structure of the stablecoin. We derive the optimal interest rate that is incentive compatible, as well as conditions for the existence of equilibria without governance attacks, and discuss implications for designing secure protocols.

翻译：我们以非拘禁稳定币的安全为模范,为风险吸收器(vaults/CDPs)和治理象征物持有者参与稳定币系统创造条件;我们采用选择定价理论,为利益攸关方的问题找到封闭式解决方案,并重视他们在稳定币资本结构中的位置;我们得出最佳利率,即激励兼容,以及为在不受治理攻击的情况下实现平衡创造条件,并讨论制定安全协议的影响。