We observe some puzzling linguistic data concerning ordinary knowledge ascriptions that embed an epistemic (im)possibility claim. We conclude that it is untenable to jointly endorse both classical logic and a pair of intuitively attractive theses: the thesis that knowledge ascriptions are always veridical and a `negative transparency' thesis that reduces knowledge of a simple negated `might' claim to an epistemic claim without modal content. We motivate a strategy for answering the trade-off: preserve veridicality and (generalized) negative transparency, while abandoning the general validity of contraposition. We survey and criticize various approaches for incorporating veridicality into domain semantics, a paradigmatic `information-sensitive' framework for capturing negative transparency and, more generally, the non-classical behavior of sentences with epistemic modals. We then present a novel information-sensitive semantics that successfully executes our favored strategy: stable acceptance semantics.

翻译：我们观察到关于嵌入认知（不）可能性的普通知识归属现象中存在一些令人困惑的语言数据。我们的结论是，同时坚持经典逻辑与两个直觉上具有吸引力的论点——知识归属始终为真的论题，以及将简单否定“可能”论断的知识还原为无模态内容的认知主张的“负透明性”论题——是不可持续的。我们提出了一种权衡策略：保留真值性和（广义的）负透明性，同时放弃逆否命题的一般有效性。我们梳理并批判了将真值性纳入领域语义学的各种方法，领域语义学是用于捕获负透明性以及更广泛地解释带有认知模态语句的非经典行为的典型“信息敏感”框架。随后，我们提出了一种新颖的信息敏感语义——稳定接受语义——成功实现了我们所偏好的策略。