On-demand and resource reservation pricing models have been widely used in cloud computing, catering to different user requirements. Nevertheless, in Multi-Access Edge Computing (MEC), as the edge has limited resources compared to the cloud, on-demand users may not get their jobs served on time, or at all, if too many resources were reserved by reservation plan users. Concurrently, reservation plan users may possess excess un-utilized quota. To optimize this resource mismatch scenario, we propose a Sharing Quota Model (SQM) where reservation plan users can re-sell unused resource quota to on-demand users, with the mobile network operator (MNO) taking a commission. To analyze the user's aggregate behavior at equilibrium and investigate the MNO's incentive of allowing re-selling, we formulate a 3-stage non-cooperative Stackelberg Game. Solving this game, we characterize the optimal strategies of buyers and re-sellers. We show that on aggregate, users' optimal strategies give rise to 4 disjoint regions, dependent on the MNO's prices and supply levels. Based on this, we characterise the MNO's optimal prices for on-demand users. Numerical results show that having both the sharing and on-demand pool gives the MNO an optimal revenue when the on-demand pool's supply is low, and when the MNO's commission is low.

翻译：按需与资源预留定价模型已广泛应用于云计算，以满足不同用户需求。然而，在多接入边缘计算（MEC）中，由于边缘资源相比云资源有限，若预留计划用户预留过多资源，按需用户可能无法及时甚至根本无法完成作业。与此同时，预留计划用户可能拥有未使用的剩余配额。为优化这种资源错配场景，我们提出了一种共享配额模型（SQM），其中预留计划用户可将未使用的资源配额转售给按需用户，移动网络运营商（MNO）从中抽取佣金。为分析用户均衡时的聚合行为并探究MNO允许转售的激励，我们构建了一个三阶段非合作斯塔克尔伯格博弈。通过求解该博弈，我们刻画了买方和转售方的最优策略。研究表明，用户聚合最优策略产生了四个互不相交的区域，这些区域取决于MNO的定价与资源供给水平。基于此，我们刻画了MNO针对按需用户的最优定价。数值结果表明，当按需资源池供给较低且MNO佣金较低时，同时存在共享池和按需池能为MNO带来最优收益。