The strategic selection of resources by selfish agents is a classic research direction, with Resource Selection Games and Congestion Games as prominent examples. In these games, agents select available resources and their utility then depends on the number of agents using the same resources. This implies that there is no distinction between the agents, i.e., they are anonymous. We depart from this very general setting by proposing Resource Selection Games with heterogeneous agents that strive for joint resource usage with similar agents. So, instead of the number of other users of a given resource, our model considers agents with different types and the decisive feature is the fraction of same-type agents among the users. More precisely, similarly to Schelling Games, there is a tolerance threshold $\tau \in [0,1]$ which specifies the agents' desired minimum fraction of same-type agents on a resource. Agents strive to select resources where at least a $\tau$-fraction of those resources' users have the same type as themselves. For $\tau=1$, our model generalizes Hedonic Diversity Games with a peak at $1$. For our general model, we consider the existence and quality of equilibria and the complexity of maximizing social welfare. Additionally, we consider a bounded rationality model, where agents can only estimate the utility of a resource, since they only know the fraction of same-type agents on a given resource, but not the exact numbers. Thus, they cannot know the impact a strategy change would have on a target resource. Interestingly, we show that this type of bounded rationality yields favorable game-theoretic properties and specific equilibria closely approximate equilibria of the full knowledge setting.

翻译：自私代理对资源的战略选择是一个经典研究方向，资源选择博弈与拥塞博弈是其中的典型代表。在这些博弈中，代理选择可用资源，其效用取决于使用相同资源的代理数量。这意味着代理之间没有区别，即它们是匿名的。我们通过提出异构代理的资源选择博弈来突破这一通用设定——其中代理会追求与相似代理共同使用资源。因此，与考虑给定资源上其他用户数量不同，我们的模型考虑了具有不同类别的代理，其决定性特征是同类代理在用户中的占比。更精确地说，与谢林博弈类似，存在容忍阈值 $\tau \in [0,1]$，该阈值规定了代理期望在资源上同类代理的最小比例。代理会努力选择那些资源使用者中至少 $\tau$ 比例的用户与自身类型相同的资源。当 $\tau=1$ 时，我们的模型泛化了一阶峰值为 $1$ 的享乐多样性博弈。针对我们的通用模型，我们考虑了均衡的存在性、均衡质量以及最大化社会福利的复杂性。此外，我们还考虑了一个有限理性模型：由于代理仅知道给定资源上同类代理的比例而非精确数量，他们只能估算资源的效用。因此，他们无法知晓策略变更对目标资源带来的影响。有趣的是，我们证明这种有限理性类型能产生有利的博弈论性质，且特定均衡能紧密逼近完全信息设定下的均衡。