While Federated Learning (FL) mitigates direct data exposure, the resulting trained models remain susceptible to membership inference attacks (MIAs). This paper presents an empirical evaluation of Differential Privacy (DP) as a defense mechanism against MIAs in FL, leveraging the environment of the 2025 NIST Genomics Privacy-Preserving Federated Learning (PPFL) Red Teaming Event. To improve inference accuracy, we propose a stacking attack strategy that ensembles seven black-box estimators to train a meta-classifier on prediction probabilities and cross-entropy losses. We evaluate this methodology against target models under three privacy configurations: an unprotected convolutional neural network (CNN, $ε=\infty$), a low-privacy DP model ($ε=200$), and a high-privacy DP model ($ε=10$). The attack outperforms all baselines in the No DP and Low Privacy settings and, critically, maintains measurable membership leakage at $ε=200$ where a single-signal LiRA baseline collapses. Evaluated on an independent third-party benchmark, these results provide an empirical characterisation of how stacking-based inference degrades across calibrated DP tiers in FL.

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