We study max-min allocation (the Santa Claus problem) and weighted Nash social welfare for $n$ agents with subadditive valuations over $m$ indivisible items. Using demand queries, we give randomized polynomial-time approximation algorithms with factors $O(\sqrt n)$ and $O(Γ(w))$, respectively, where $Γ(w)=\exp((\ln n-H(w))/2)$ and $H(w)=-\sum_i w_i\ln w_i$ for positive weights summing to one. Both ratios are independent of $m$. The max-min result improves the $2n-1$ bound of Khot and Ponnuswami (2007). We also give simpler $O(\sqrt n)$ algorithms for additive valuations and for submodular valuations with value queries, improving the $O(\sqrt{n\log n})$ bound of Saha and Srinivasan (2018) in the additive case. For Nash welfare, $Γ(w)=1$ for equal weights and $Γ(w)\le\sqrt n$ in general. We prove a configuration-LP integrality gap of $Θ(Γ(w))$ for every prescribed weight vector, even for XOS valuations. For every fixed $D>0$, we also prove information-theoretic approximation lower bounds of $Ω_D(\sqrt{n/\ln n})$ and $Ω_D(Γ(w)/\sqrt{\ln n})$, respectively, for randomized algorithms making at most $n^D$ adaptive queries. These hold on XOS instances with $m=Θ(n)$ items, even with simultaneous access to value, demand, and XOS supporting-clause oracles. They apply both to guarantees with success probability at least $2/3$ and to guarantees in expected welfare. The weighted bound holds for every prescribed weight vector and is vacuous below one. Thus the oracle lower bounds are within an $O(\sqrt{\ln n})$ factor of our upper bounds, while the configuration-LP gaps match them up to constants. Our algorithms build on random matchings for large items and charge the aggregate loss across configurations to the at most $n$ matched items.

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