This paper analyzes Stackelberg Gaussian signaling games under linear sensitivity mismatch, generalizing standard additive and constant-bias models. We characterize the Stackelberg equilibrium structure for both noiseless and noisy signaling regimes. In the noiseless case, we show that the encoder selectively reveals information along specific eigenspaces of a cost-mismatch matrix. We then extend the analysis to the noisy regime and derive analytical thresholds for the existence of informative equilibria, demonstrating a sharp phase transition where communication collapses into silence if the sensitivity mismatch is sufficiently high, in contrast with the fully revealing equilibria often found in constant-bias models.

翻译：本文分析了线性灵敏度失配下的Stackelberg高斯信号传输博弈，推广了标准的加性和恒定偏差模型。我们刻画了无噪声和有噪声信号传输机制下的Stackelberg均衡结构。在无噪声情况下，我们证明了编码器沿着成本失配矩阵的特定特征空间选择性地揭示信息。随后，我们将分析扩展到有噪声机制，推导了信息性均衡存在的解析阈值，并展示了一个尖锐的相变现象：当灵敏度失配足够高时，通信会完全崩溃为沉默状态，这与恒定偏差模型中常见的完全揭示均衡形成鲜明对比。