We consider secure distributed matrix multiplication, in which a user computes the product of two matrices with the help of honest-but-curious servers, any $T$ of which may collude. Using the outer-product partition, the matrices are split into $K$ and $L$ blocks and hidden by random masks. Assuming the user has precomputed the products of the random matrices, we develop methods that use this precomputation to reduce the number of servers required. Polynomial codes are designed through degree tables, whose distinct entries count the servers. We show that precomputation can reduce the minimum number of servers by designing degree tables specifically for this setting. For Gap Additive Secure Polynomial (GASPr) codes, we give a precise formula and show that it is monotone in the chain length $r$, so only the extremes GASP_small and GASP_big matter. We also prove lower bounds attained by GASP_small in several regimes. Consequently, any fraction of colluding servers below one can be tolerated, compared to the threshold of one half without precomputation, and the order of the total computational complexity decreases when the colluders are a fixed fraction of the servers. We show that no existing construction uses fewer servers than the better of GASP_small and GASP_big once the mask products are precomputed. We introduce Gap-Reduced Additive Secure Polynomial (GRASP) codes, which retain a single interval for the mask degrees while selecting the information degrees carefully. For $K = T = 4$ and every $L \geq 3$, we give an explicit GRASP code that uses one fewer server than every GASPr code and is within two servers of optimal. For large $T$, the configuration becomes an integer packing problem independent of $T$, and the number of servers saved by GRASP over GASPr grows quadratically in $K$ and $L$.
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