In a weighted majority voting game, the players' weights are determined based on the constitutional planner's intentions. The weights are challenging to change in numerous cases, as they represent some desired disparity. However, the voting weights and the actual voting power do not necessarily coincide. Changing a decision threshold would offer some remedy. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is one of the most important international organisations that uses a weighted voting system to make decisions. The voting weights in its Board of Governors depend on the quotas of the 191 member countries, which reflect their economic strengths to some extent. We analyse the connection between the decision threshold and the a priori voting power of the countries by calculating the Banzhaf indices for each threshold between 50% and 87%. The difference between quotas and voting powers is minimised if the decision threshold is 58% or 59%.

翻译：在加权多数投票博弈中，参与者的投票权重基于宪政规划者的意图来确定。在许多情况下，这些权重难以改变，因为它们反映了某种预期的差异。然而，投票权重与实际投票权力并不一定吻合。改变决策阈值可以提供一定的补救措施。国际货币基金组织（IMF）是采用加权投票系统进行决策的最重要的国际组织之一。其理事会中的投票权重取决于191个成员国的配额，这些配额在一定程度上反映了各国的经济实力。我们通过计算50%至87%之间每个阈值的班扎夫指数，分析了决策阈值与各国先验投票权力之间的关系。当决策阈值为58%或59%时，配额与投票权力之间的差异最小化。