We propose a combinatorial ascending auction that is "approximately" optimal, requiring minimal rationality to achieve this level of optimality, and is robust to strategic and distributional uncertainties. Specifically, the auction is rank-guaranteed, meaning that for any menu M and any valuation profile, the ex-post revenue is guaranteed to be at least as high as the highest revenue achievable from feasible allocations, taking the (|M|+ 1)th-highest valuation for each bundle as the price. Our analysis highlights a crucial aspect of combinatorial auction design, namely, the design of menus. We provide simple and approximately optimal menus in various settings.

翻译：我们提出了一种组合升价拍卖机制，该机制具有"近似"最优性，仅需最低限度的理性假设即可达到此最优水平，并对策略不确定性和分布不确定性具有鲁棒性。具体而言，该拍卖具有秩保证特性，这意味着对于任意菜单M和任意估值剖面，事后收益保证不低于从可行分配中可获得的最大收益，其中每个组合的价格取为其第(|M|+1)高的估值。我们的分析揭示了组合拍卖设计中的一个关键维度——菜单设计。我们在多种场景下提供了简单且近似最优的菜单设计方案。