In contract design, the principal is often better informed about the project's chances of succeeding than the agents. To incentivize effort, the principal has two main tools: first, to design a contract, sharing part of the project's success among the agents; second, to design a (Bayesian) persuasion scheme, selectively sharing information with the agents. In this work we are interested in the optimal combination of both these tools. We tackle the joint problem through the prism of simplicity vs. optimality, and establish a stark dichotomy: The simple disclosure scheme of full transparency achieves a tight $4/3$-approximation to the optimal combination of information disclosure and team contract, when the team's production function is submodular. In contrast, full transparency can be arbitrarily far from optimal when production is supermodular. The techniques that we develop to bound the gap for submodular functions, also yield a new deterministic polynomial-time approximation algorithm for pure multi-agent contract design, with a significantly improved approximation ratio of $2.311$, and thus a $3.081$-approximation algorithm for the joint information and contracting problem.

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