Language agents are moving from single-user assistants to shared collaborators in workspaces, forums, and group chats. A shared agent observes interleaved messages from multiple users, maintains persistent context, and executes tool actions, creating a boundary problem absent from standard single-user agents: the agent must decide not only whether an instruction is safe, but which user or task it is allowed to govern. We identify cross-user poisoning (CUP), where an adversary injects a message into shared context that is later applied while the agent serves a benign user, causing unauthorized actions or responses outside the instruction's intended scope. We validate CUP on two deployed multi-user agents, Continua and ElizaOS, and introduce MURMUR, a framework for evaluating shared-context agents under concurrent multi-user interactions. Across Slack, Workspace, and Airline domains, CUP achieves high attack success, persists across later interactions, and remains substantially more effective than matched prompt-injection attacks. We evaluate boundary-scoping defenses and find that context summarization alone is insufficient, while task clustering and provenance prompting substantially reduce non-adaptive propagation. These results show that robust multi-user agents require explicit user/task scoping rather than generic input filtering or context compression.

翻译：暂无翻译