Credences are mental states corresponding to degrees of confidence in propositions. Attribution of credences to Large Language Models (LLMs) is commonplace in the empirical literature on LLM evaluation. Yet the theoretical basis for LLM credence attribution is unclear. We defend three claims. First, our semantic claim is that LLM credence attributions are (at least in general) correctly interpreted literally, as expressing truth-apt beliefs on the part of scientists that purport to describe facts about LLM credences. Second, our metaphysical claim is that the existence of LLM credences is at least plausible, although current evidence is inconclusive. Third, our epistemic claim is that LLM credence attributions made in the empirical literature on LLM evaluation are subject to non-trivial sceptical concerns. It is a distinct possibility that even if LLMs have credences, LLM credence attributions are generally false because the experimental techniques used to assess LLM credences are not truth-tracking.

翻译：置信度是对命题持有不同程度信心的心理状态。在大型语言模型（LLM）评估的实证研究中，对LLM进行置信度归因是普遍做法。然而，LLM置信度归因的理论基础尚不明确。本文论证三个主张：第一，语义主张认为LLM置信度归因（至少通常）应被准确解读为字面意义，即表达研究者试图描述LLM置信度事实的真值可评估信念。第二，形而上学主张认为LLM置信度的存在至少具有合理性，尽管现有证据尚无定论。第三，认识论主张指出当前LLM评估实证研究中的置信度归因存在非平凡的怀疑性质疑。即使LLM确实具有置信度，由于评估LLM置信度的实验技术可能不具备真值追踪性，LLM置信度归因普遍为假仍是一种显著存在的可能性。