Computing equilibria is a fundamental algorithmic problem in game theory and economics. Although general frameworks are available for proving membership in FIXP, the class capturing exact fixed-point computation, establishing FIXP-completeness often remains challenging. We prove FIXP-completeness of exact equilibrium computation in three second-price auction models: (1). pacing with return-on-investment constraints, with multiplier cap $1+δ$ for every fixed rational $δ>0$ [Filos-Ratsikas, Hansen, Høgh, and Hollender (2024)]; (2). budget-constrained generalized second-price sponsored shopping [Hansen, Li, and Nie (2026)]; (3). budget-constrained throttling [Liu (2026)]. These results resolve open questions on the exact complexity of automated bidding. Our technical ingredient is a FIXP-complete generalized-circuit problem using only clipped affine gates and the reciprocal $x\mapsto1/(1+τx)$, for any fixed positive rational $τ$. This gate basis provides a common framework for the three auction reductions: simulating these gates in each model establishes FIXP-hardness without directly implementing multiplication or squaring.

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