Swarms of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) detect Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) spoofing by checking the drones' reported positions against their known formation. Formation-preserving spoofing evades this check: in GNSS-WASP, one transmitter per satellite, a few kilometres away, shifts the whole swarm while keeping its formation. We show that such an attack still leaves a trace below the position level. Because the transmitters are close, each drone sees them under a slightly different angle, and this parallax bends the signal arrival times across a 90 m swarm by 20-40 cm for a transmitter at 5 km, whatever delays the attacker applies. We propose a likelihood ratio test that reads this trace from the pseudoranges and Doppler every drone already measures, with all clocks and attacker delays unknown and no extra antennas. In simulations with real GPS and Galileo orbits and white receiver noise, 16 drones detect GNSS-WASP at 5 km in 13-60% of 10 s windows in straight flight and in every window during a formation turn with a precise Doppler receiver, where the countermeasure proposed with GNSS-WASP detects at most 5%. The same test also catches single-transmitter and ground-array spoofing.
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