In 2021 Ethereum adjusted the transaction pricing mechanism by implementing EIP-1559, which introduces the base fee - a fixed network fee per block that is burned and adjusted dynamically in accordance with network demand. The authors of the Ethereum Improvement Proposal (EIP) noted that a miner with more than 50% of the mining power might have an incentive to deviate from the honest mining strategy. Instead, such a miner could propose a series of empty blocks to increase its future rewards. In this paper, we generalize this attack and show that under rational player behavior, deviating from the honest strategy can be profitable for a miner with less than 50% of the mining power. Further, even when miners do not collaborate, it is rational for smaller mining power miners to join the attack.

翻译：2021年，以太坊通过实施EIP-1559调整了交易定价机制，该提案引入了基础费用——每个区块中固定燃烧的网络费用，并根据网络需求进行动态调整。以太坊改进提案（EIP）的作者指出，持有超过50%算力的矿工可能存在偏离诚实挖矿策略的动机。这类矿工可能通过提议一系列空区块来增加其未来收益。在本文中，我们概括了这一攻击方式，并证明在理性行为者假设下，拥有低于50%算力的矿工偏离诚实策略也能获利。此外，即使矿工之间不进行合作，算力较小的矿工加入攻击也属于理性行为。