As quantum computers scale, the rise of multi-user and cloud-based quantum platforms can lead to new security challenges. Attacks within shared execution environments become increasingly feasible due to the crosstalk noise that, in combination with quantum computer's hardware specifications, can be exploited in form of crosstalk attack. Our work pursues crosstalk attack implementation in ion-trap quantum computers. We propose three novel quantum crosstalk attacks designed for ion trap qubits: (i) Alternate CNOT attack (ii) Superposition Alternate CNOT (SAC) attack (iii) Alternate Phase Change (APC) attack. We demonstrate the effectiveness of proposed attacks by conducting noise-based simulations on a commercial 20-qubit ion-trap quantum computer. The proposed attacks achieve an impressive reduction of up to 42.2% in output probability for Quantum Full Adders (QFA) having 6 to 9-qubit output. Finally, we investigate the possibility of mitigating crosstalk attacks by using Residue Number System (RNS) based Parallel Quantum Addition (PQA). We determine that PQA achieves higher attack resilience against crosstalk attacks in the form of 24.3% to 133.5% improvement in output probability against existing Non Parallel Quantum Addition (NPQA). Through our systematic methodology, we demonstrate how quantum properties such as superposition and phase transition can lead to crosstalk attacks and also how parallel quantum computing can help secure against these attacks.

翻译：随着量子计算机规模的扩大，多用户和云量子平台的兴起可能带来新的安全挑战。由于串扰噪声的存在，结合量子计算机的硬件特性，共享执行环境内的攻击变得日益可行，这种噪声可被利用形成串扰攻击。本研究致力于在离子阱量子计算机中实现串扰攻击。我们提出了三种针对离子阱量子比特的新型量子串扰攻击：(i) 交替CNOT攻击 (ii) 叠加交替CNOT（SAC）攻击 (iii) 交替相位改变（APC）攻击。通过在商用20量子比特离子阱量子计算机上进行基于噪声的仿真，我们证明了所提攻击的有效性。对于具有6至9量子比特输出的量子全加器（QFA），所提出的攻击实现了输出概率高达42.2%的显著降低。最后，我们探讨了通过使用基于余数系统（RNS）的并行量子加法（PQA）来缓解串扰攻击的可能性。我们确定，与现有的非并行量子加法（NPQA）相比，PQA以输出概率提高24.3%至133.5%的形式，实现了对串扰攻击更高的抗攻击能力。通过我们的系统化方法，我们展示了诸如叠加和相位跃迁等量子特性如何导致串扰攻击，以及并行量子计算如何有助于防范这些攻击。