Benaloh challenge allows the voter to audit the encryption of her vote, and in particular to check whether the vote has been represented correctly. An interesting analysis of the mechanism has been presented by Culnane and Teague. The authors propose a natural game-theoretic model of the interaction between the voter and a corrupt, malicious encryption device. Then, they claim that there is no "natural" rational strategy for the voter to play the game. In consequence, the authorities cannot provide the voter with a sensible auditing strategy, which undermines the whole idea. Here, we claim the contrary, i.e., that there exist simple rational strategies that justify the usefulness of Benaloh challenge.

翻译：Benaloh挑战允许选民检查其选票加密的正确性，特别是验证选票是否被正确表示。Culnane和Teague对此机制进行了有趣的分析，他们提出了一个自然的博弈论模型来刻画选民与恶意加密设备之间的交互，并声称不存在"自然的"理性策略供选民参与博弈。由此推论，当局无法向选民提供合理的审计策略，这从根本上动摇了整个机制的设计初衷。本文观点与之相反，我们证明存在简单理性的策略，能够充分证明Benaloh挑战的有效性。