Mining attacks allow adversaries to obtain a disproportionate share of the mining reward by deviating from the honest mining strategy in the Bitcoin system. Among them, the most well-known are selfish mining (SM), block withholding (BWH), fork after withholding (FAW) and bribery mining. In this paper, we propose two novel mining attacks: bribery semi-selfish mining (BSSM) and bribery stubborn mining (BSM). Both of them can increase the relative extra reward of the adversary and will make the target bribery miners suffer from the bribery miner dilemma. All targets earn less under the Nash equilibrium. For each target, their local optimal strategy is to accept the bribes. However, they will suffer losses, comparing with denying the bribes. Furthermore, for all targets, their global optimal strategy is to deny the bribes. Quantitative analysis and simulation have been verified our theoretical analysis. We propose practical measures to mitigate more advanced mining attack strategies based on bribery mining, and provide new ideas for addressing bribery mining attacks in the future. However, how to completely and effectively prevent these attacks is still needed on further research.

翻译：挖矿攻击允许攻击者通过偏离比特币系统中的诚实挖矿策略，获取不成比例的挖矿收益。其中最为人熟知的有自私挖矿、区块扣留、扣留后分叉和贿赂挖矿。本文提出了两种新型挖矿攻击：贿赂半自私挖矿和贿赂顽固挖矿。这两种攻击均能增加攻击者的相对超额收益，并使目标贿赂矿工陷入贿赂矿工困境。在纳什均衡下，所有目标收益均降低。对每个目标而言，其局部最优策略是接受贿赂，但与拒绝贿赂相比，他们将遭受损失。此外，对所有目标而言，其全局最优策略是拒绝贿赂。定量分析与仿真验证了我们的理论分析。我们提出了切实可行的措施来缓解基于贿赂挖矿的更高级挖矿攻击策略，并为未来解决贿赂挖矿攻击提供新思路。然而，如何完全有效防范这些攻击仍需进一步研究。