In this paper, we investigate the impact of reward schemes and committee sizes motivated by governance systems over blockchain communities. We introduce a model for elections with a binary outcome space where there is a ground truth (i.e., a "correct" outcome), and where stakeholders can only choose to delegate their voting power to a set of delegation representatives (DReps). Moreover, the effort (cost) invested by each DRep positively influences both (i) her ability to vote correctly and (ii) the total delegation that she attracts, thereby increasing her voting power. This model constitutes the natural counterpart of delegated proof-of-stake (PoS) protocols, where delegated stakes are used to elect the block builders. As a way to motivate the representatives to exert effort, a reward scheme can be used based on the delegation attracted by each DRep. We analyze both the game-theoretic aspects and the optimization counterpart of this model. Our primary focus is on selecting a committee that maximizes the probability of reaching the correct outcome, given a fixed monetary budget allocated for rewarding the delegates. Our findings provide insights into the design of effective reward mechanisms and optimal committee structures (i.e., how many DReps are enough) in these PoS-like governance systems.

翻译：本文研究了受区块链社区治理系统启发的奖励机制与委员会规模的影响。我们引入了一个二元结果空间的选举模型，其中存在一个基本事实（即“正确”结果），且利益相关者只能选择将其投票权委托给一组委托代表（DReps）。此外，每位DRep投入的努力（成本）会正向影响其（i）正确投票的能力，以及（ii）所吸引的总委托量，从而增强其投票权。该模型构成了委托权益证明（PoS）协议的自然对应物，其中委托的权益被用于选举区块构建者。作为一种激励代表付出努力的方式，可以基于每位DRep吸引的委托量设计奖励机制。我们分析了该模型的博弈论层面及其优化对应问题。我们的主要关注点在于，在给定用于奖励代表的固定货币预算下，如何选择一个能最大化达成正确结果概率的委员会。我们的研究结果为这类类PoS治理系统中有效奖励机制的设计和最优委员会结构（即需要多少DReps才足够）提供了见解。