This paper investigates strategic interactions within a three party deception security game involving a defender, an insider, and external attackers. We propose a robust deception mechanism where the leader manipulates game parameters perceived by followers to enhance defense performance when followers operate under misperceived and uncertain observation. Specifically, we propose a unified three party leader follower game framework and introduce the concepts of Deception Stackelberg equilibria (DSE) and Hyper Nash equilibria (HNE), which generalize classical two-player Stackelberg and deception games. We develop necessary and sufficient conditions for the consistency between DSE and HNE, ensuring that the defender's utility remains invariant when the hierarchical structure degenerates into a simultaneous-move scenario. Moreover, we propose a scalable hypergradient-based algorithm with established convergence guarantees for seeking DSE, efficiently addressing the computational challenges posed by non-smooth and set-valued best-response mappings. Finally, we apply theoretical analysis to practical scenarios in secure wireless communication and defense against insider-assisted false data injection attacks.

翻译：本文研究涉及防御者、内鬼和外部攻击者的三方欺骗安全博弈中的策略互动。我们提出了一种鲁棒的欺骗机制，领导者通过操纵追随者感知的博弈参数，在追随者基于错误感知和不确定观测行动时提升防御性能。具体而言，我们构建了统一的三方领导者-追随者博弈框架，并引入欺骗Stackelberg均衡（DSE）与超纳什均衡（HNE）的概念，推广了经典的两方Stackelberg博弈和欺骗博弈。我们推导了DSE与HNE一致性的充要条件，确保当层级结构退化为同时行动场景时，防御者的效用保持不变。此外，我们提出了一种可扩展的基于超梯度的算法，并建立了其收敛性保证，有效解决了由非光滑和集值最优响应映射带来的计算挑战。最后，我们将理论分析应用于安全无线通信和对抗内鬼辅助虚假数据注入攻击的防御实践场景。