Physical layer deception (PLD) combines physical layer security (PLS) with deception: the transmitter actively misleads the eavesdropper with falsified information. We model the transmitter-eavesdropper interaction as a Stackelberg game in which the transmitter commits to a resource allocation and encryption strategy, and each receiver best-responds by selecting among three decryption modes: Perception, Dropping, and Exclusion. Using semantic distortion as the metric, we derive closed-form switching surfaces that partition the parameter space into strategy regimes and identify conditions under which each regime dominates. The robust operating point, at the peak of the worst-case distortion envelope, is shown to be a Stackelberg equilibrium; iterative best-response dynamics oscillate around it with strictly lower time-averaged security. We evaluate the design under Nakagami-m fading with static and adaptive transmitter strategies, benchmarked against a classical PLS baseline. Numerical results validate the regime characterization and show 12-55% higher eavesdropper distortion than the erasure-only baseline across all fading conditions.

翻译：物理层欺骗（PLD）将物理层安全（PLS）与欺骗技术相结合：发送方主动利用虚假信息误导窃听方。我们将发送方与窃听方之间的交互建模为一个Stackelberg博弈，其中发送方承诺采用资源分配与加密策略，而各接收方通过选择三种解密模式（感知、丢弃、排除）做出最佳响应。以语义失真为度量指标，我们推导出参数空间划分中策略区域的闭式切换曲面，并识别每种区域占优的条件。鲁棒工作点位于最坏情况失真包络的峰值处，被证明是Stackelberg均衡；迭代最佳响应动力学围绕该点振荡，且时间平均安全性严格更低。我们分别在静态与自适应发送方策略下评估了Nakagami-m衰落信道中的设计，并以经典PLS基线作为基准。数值结果验证了区域划分特性，并表明在所有衰落条件下，窃听方失真比纯擦除基线高12-55%。