Autonomous research systems can produce convincing manuscripts whose scientific value is difficult to verify, while automated reviewers can reward the appearance of completeness. We examine how this gap can become a self-reinforcing threat to the research community. In a two-population evolutionary game, authors choose between acceptance-oriented and exploratory research, and reviewers choose between proxy evaluation and careful assessment. Cheaper acceptance-oriented production can increase review pressure, making proxy assessment more attractive; proxy assessment can in turn strengthen the incentive to produce reviewer-compatible work. We derive conditions under which this feedback sustains a stable regime that rewards publication success while reducing the scientific value of accepted work. An analytical basin boundary explains why the same institutional rules can support either this regime or exploratory research with careful review. Numerical illustrations show how publication counts can conceal scientific loss, how faster adjustment can reinforce existing practices, and why partial reform may fail once the cycle is established. Careful audits and reviewer rewards can reverse the feedback, while temporary support can produce lasting recovery if it moves the community across the basin boundary. The model identifies a warning mechanism rather than forecasting a particular conference: a review system can remain operational and privately rewarding while becoming less effective at supporting discovery. Its institutional implication is to reward independently validated contributions and consequential checking, rather than accelerate paper production and scoring alone.

翻译：暂无翻译