As advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) propel progress in the life sciences, they may also enable the weaponisation and misuse of biological agents. This article differentiates two classes of AI tools that could pose such biosecurity risks: large language models (LLMs) and biological design tools (BDTs). LLMs, such as GPT-4 and its successors, might provide dual-use information and thus remove some barriers encountered by historical biological weapons efforts. As LLMs are turned into multi-modal lab assistants and autonomous science tools, this will increase their ability to support non-experts in performing laboratory work. Thus, LLMs may in particular lower barriers to biological misuse. In contrast, BDTs will expand the capabilities of sophisticated actors. Concretely, BDTs may enable the creation of pandemic pathogens substantially worse than anything seen to date and could enable forms of more predictable and targeted biological weapons. In combination, the convergence of LLMs and BDTs could raise the ceiling of harm from biological agents and could make them broadly accessible. A range of interventions would help to manage risks. Independent pre-release evaluations could help understand the capabilities of models and the effectiveness of safeguards. Options for differentiated access to such tools should be carefully weighed with the benefits of openly releasing systems. Lastly, essential for mitigating risks will be universal and enhanced screening of gene synthesis products.

翻译：随着人工智能（AI）在生命科学领域的进步推动发展，它也可能导致生物制剂的武器化和误用。本文区分了两类可能构成此类生物安全风险的AI工具：大型语言模型（LLMs）和生物设计工具（BDTs）。LLMs（如GPT-4及其后续版本）可能提供双重用途信息，从而消除历史生物武器尝试面临的一些障碍。随着LLMs转变为多模态实验室助手和自主科学工具，它们支持非专业人士进行实验室工作的能力将增强。因此，LLMs可能特别降低生物误用的门槛。相比之下，BDTs将扩大高端行为者的能力。具体而言，BDTs可能促成制造比迄今所见严重得多的大流行病原体，并可能实现更具可预测性和针对性的生物武器形式。组合来看，LLMs与BDTs的融合可能提高生物制剂的危害上限，并使其广泛可及。一系列干预措施将有助于管理风险。独立的发布前评估有助于理解模型能力及安全保障的有效性。应仔细权衡此类工具的差异化访问选项与开放发布系统的益处。最后，对降低风险至关重要的措施是对基因合成产品进行全面且增强的筛查。