A large audio language model (LALM) attaches a speech front end to a text language model (LM) that is already safety-aligned. When such a model refuses a harmful spoken request, is the refusal carried by the front end, or inherited from the text LM? We test this with causal interventions. At each model's audio-to-LM interface and at tested LM residual layers, we fit a direction separating harmful from benign prompts, ablate its component, and measure the resulting change in the model's first-token refusal margin. Four of the five models are evaluated under held-out category shift. Across five LALMs spanning three backbone families, with three models passing a baseline safety gate, the largest tested effects occur in a mid-to-late LM band, while ablations of the tested interface directions have little effect. On Qwen2.5-Omni, ablating the L16 direction changes the margin by -7.10, versus -0.013 at the projector. The audio pathway is still in use: zeroing the encoder output changes the margin by -4.7. In the same model, the contrast is linearly decodable at an early layer where single-layer ablation has little effect, and a direction fitted on the LM backbone alone transfers to the full audio model. Because harmful and benign prompts also differ in form, we interpret the direction as refusal-linked rather than harmfulness-specific. These interventions localize dependence of the refusal margin, not where refusal is computed. Moving the margin also does not always change what the model writes. Safety audits of these models should use interventions rather than rely on probes alone, and should examine the inherited text LM alongside the audio interface.

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