Sharing systems have facilitated the redistribution of underused resources by providing convenient online marketplaces for individual sellers and buyers. However, sellers in these systems may not fully disclose the information of their shared commodities, due to strategic behaviors or privacy concerns. Sellers' strategic information disclosure significantly affects buyers' user experiences and systems' reputation. This paper presents the first analytical study on information disclosure and pricing of competing sellers in sharing systems. In particular, we propose a two-stage game framework to capture sellers' strategic behaviors and buyers' decisions. Although the optimization problem is challenging due to sellers' non-convex and non-monotonic objectives, we completely characterize the complex market equilibria by decomposing it into several tractable subproblems. We demonstrate that full disclosure by all sellers or non-disclosure by all sellers will both lead to intense price competition. The former all-disclosure case is never an equilibrium even when all sellers have good commodity qualities and low privacy costs, while the latter non-disclosure case can be an equilibrium under which all sellers get zero profit. We also reveal several critical factors that affect sellers' information disclosure. Interestingly, sellers' sharing capacity limitation and buyers' estimation biases encourage information disclosure as they mitigate sellers' competition.

翻译：共享系统通过为个人卖家和买家提供便捷的在线市场，促进了未充分利用资源的再分配。然而，由于策略性行为或隐私顾虑，这些系统中的卖家可能不完全披露其共享商品的信息。卖家的策略性信息揭示显著影响买家的用户体验和系统声誉。本文首次对共享系统中竞争卖家的信息揭示与定价进行理论分析。具体而言，我们提出一个两阶段博弈框架来刻画卖家的策略性行为与买家的决策。尽管由于卖家目标的非凸性和非单调性导致优化问题具有挑战性，我们通过将问题分解为若干易处理的子问题，完整刻画了复杂的市场均衡。我们发现，所有卖家完全信息揭示或完全不揭示均会导致激烈的价格竞争。前者（完全揭示情形）即使在所有卖家均拥有良好商品质量且隐私成本较低时也从未成为均衡；而后者（完全不揭示情形）可能成为均衡，此时所有卖家利润为零。我们还揭示了影响卖家信息揭示的关键因素。有趣的是，卖家的共享容量限制与买家的估计偏差会缓解卖家间的竞争，从而激励信息揭示。